Malta’s external security by Fenech, Dominic
 It is an indication of the bond between the history
of Malta and that of the Mediterranean that since
antiquity the Maltese islands have consistently
belonged to the ascendant imperial power in the
Mediterranean. Small, arid and costly to defend
though it might be, its central position between north
and south and east and west, enhanced by its pos-
session of excellent harbours, has accorded to it a
unique strategic location that no power intent upon
the domination or control of the Mediterranean could
afford to leave in someone else’s hands. From the
point of view of the respective imperial powers
therefore, the possession of Malta has been a means
to an end, not an end in itself. No territorial value,
population numbers, natural resources, markets or
prestige was entailed: only a unique location. Until
the onset of early modern history, Malta’s strategic
value was generally speaking negative. Thus, under
the Spanish Habsburgs, and until the arrival in Malta
of the crusading Order of St. John, control of Malta
was imperative to deny the Muslim Ottomans a
foothold in the western, Christian, hemisphere in
what was essentially an east-west Mediterranean cold
war. Then in 1530, the Knights of St. John were sub-
contracted to take care of the island’s security and
Malta was transformed into a highly fortified frontier
fortress actively involved in the defence of western
Christendom, as well as a naval base for waging a
holy war of attrition against Muslims. At the end of
the eighteenth century, after a brief and abortive
Napoleonic occupation (1798–1800), Malta passed
into British hands, there to remain until independence
in 1964, or until the final departure of the British
services in 1979. Keen internal political disagreement
as to which of the two dates represented the true end
of Malta’s colonial history is itself a measure of the
centrality in Maltese history of the island’s strategic
function.
The incorporation of Malta into the British empire,
effectively in 1800 and formally in 1813, took place
about a century after the British occupation of
Gibraltar of 1704. Britain can be said to have been
the first non-Mediterranean imperial power to regard
the Mediterranean as a single geostrategic region.
This approach is borne out by the fact that, for most
of the two and a half centuries during which it
enjoyed mastery of the sea, Britain showed little
interest in building a Mediterranean empire and, until
quite late in the nineteenth century, was mainly inter-
ested in possessing or controlling only strategic
islands and channels in the Mediterranean. From such
positions and through such control, Britain was in a
position to pursue effectively its interests both as an
imperial and as a European power (Fenech 1, 1993).
As the nineteenth century progressed, and as
Mediterranean affairs increasingly became the focus
of British foreign policy, normally directed at French
and Russian competition, Malta was transformed into
Britain’s Mediterranean naval headquarters. On top
of the already formidable military infrastructure
bequeathed by the Knights of St. John, the British
built Malta into a state-of-the-art fortress and naval
base, complete with several dry docks and every
other facility required to service a world class fleet.
Malta became effectively Britain’s home port in the
Mediterranean (Lee, 1972).
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Abstract: For a small country whose main relevance to the outside world has always been
its strategic location and whose known history has been moulded by that fact, security has
been remarkably low on the list of priorities on Malta’s national agenda since independence.
In recent years, security has become an issue of keen political debate, although security per
se may not be the real reason why the subject has been brought out into the limelight by
both government and opposition. More than just an issue in its own right, security began fea-
turing rather more as a function of the main direction of Malta’s foreign policy, which during
the past decade has been focused on relations with the European Union.
It followed naturally that under two lengthy
foreign dominations, between them spanning four
and a half centuries, first under the Knights of St.
John and later under the British, and both exclusively
concerned with supporting a much greater security
plan, the fortunes of Malta and its people became
inexorably bound with those of their rulers. That is
to say, not merely their security from an outside
threat, but even more especially their livelihood,
became dependent on the amount of foreign money
spent on defence. As the foreign rulers sank more and
more capital building the defensive and offensive
capability of their possession, military spending
became the linchpin of the economy itself (Bowen-
Jones, 1961: 115–125; 165–175). In the long run, the
economic survival of the Maltese population became
excessively dependent upon the security needs of
their foreign rulers. This phenomenon became
reflected in the very relations between the Maltese
people and their rulers, which generally speaking
were friendly when spending was high, and antago-
nistic only when spending was low. Indeed, for the
Maltese the issue of their national security came to
be taken for granted – they were contributing to the
security of a power much greater than them, and
incidentally their own security was taken care of –
the only consciously relevant issue being the
economic spin-off. This period straddling the entire
length of Maltese modern history thus represented
two salient and connected features. The first was the
transformation of Malta from a highly insecure rock
to an unbeatable fortress. The second was the trans-
formation of Malta’s economy from one of self-suf-
ficient subsistence to a more affluent one inordinately
dependent of the security needs of others. It is small
wonder therefore that by and large the issue of
national security has kept a low profile in public
debate since independence, in favour of the central
challenge of how to reconstruct the island’s economy
from one bound to another country’s defence
spending into a truly independent civilian economy.
In the process of meeting that challenge then, Maltese
governments aimed to trade the island’s strategic
value for cash, in so doing focusing still more on the
security requirements of others than its own.
When considering the subject of security, the
single most important feature about Malta is its
minuscule size. This, combined with its necessarily
small population makes Malta impossible to defend
against a determined aggressor without outside help.
If the average Maltese today worries little about the
prospect of a new foreign occupation or military
aggression, that is only because in the current inter-
national culture, at least in this hemisphere of the
world, one tends to take for granted the non-aggres-
siveness of states. It is also because it is difficult to
identify any specific threat. Such a perception may
appear foolhardy, considering that besides being
European, Malta is equally close to the Arab world,
where warfare has been going on intermittently not
too far away from its shores, among its southern
neighbours. That may well be due to the fact that for
many Maltese it is unthinkable that a European state,
however peripheral to the continent, can be subjected
to an external attack and left in the lurch by its
northern neighbours. Aggression from a European
state is even more unthinkable. A review of Malta’s
security arrangements in the years since indepen-
dence shows that some provision was made for
Malta’s defence, but that national security by and
large has been allowed to depend more on the good
will of others than on solid guarantees. This attitude
is perhaps best borne out by Malta’s unilateral
declaration of neutrality, informally at first but
eventually underwritten by Italy and ultimately
entrenched in the country’s constitution in 1987.
One can say therefore that in contemporary times
Malta enjoys a sense of security, rather than a state
of security. That may be regarded as the synthesis
of two previous phases in the history of the island’s
security. During the first phase, which lasted until
1530, Malta was effectively indefensible. It could be
and was taken by whichever regional power had the
strength and wish to do so. Indeed, the possibility of
sovereignty, as opposed to nationhood, escaped
Maltese leaders until well into the twentieth century.
Malta not only belonged to an imperial power, in this
case Spain, but it was a part of Sicily. Its long term
security was more dependent on the strength of the
imperial power that possessed it – that is on its non-
sovereignty – than any ability of the island’s garrison
and fortifications to keep away an invader. In the
short term it was completely exposed, especially to
marauding corsairs whose aim was not to occupy, but
to plunder, and who therefore were not deterred by
fear of the metropolitan power. Settlements clustered
around the central heights of the island, a passive
defence strategy to keep the maximum distance from
the exposed coastline. The mission of the crusading
Knights of St. John introduced the second phase in
the history of Malta’s security. As an outpost for the
Christian west in the Mediterranean east-west
contest, Malta was rendered capable of defending
itself and transforming its insularity from a liability
into an asset. The Great Siege of 1565, where Malta
held out against the Turkish attempt to capture the
island, demonstrated the logistic difficulties for an
overseas enemy faced with an enduring resistance
and the likelihood of external relief, however belated.
A look at Malta’s physical appearance immediately
reveals an island fortress in the literal sense of the
word. The harbours are surrounded by staggering
bastions and the coastline is littered with observation
posts, all relics of a past when the island had to be
capable of holding out against an aggressor, possibly
for a long period of time, until outside assistance
could be obtained. Defence strategy became an active
one, settling in and fortifying the harbours to meet
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the enemy preferably before landing and even to be
ready to sail and seek him out. This pattern was
consolidated under the British, who not only
patrolled the Mediterranean sea anyway and there-
fore the approaches to Malta, but maintained a
peacetime garrison large enough to defend the island
at all times. Only once was Malta’s security seriously
threatened, during the Second World War, and that
chiefly because air power rendered obsolete most of
the traditional premises of defence.
Advances in military technology, though highly
relevant, were not alone in changing the security role
of Malta in the Second World War and its aftermath.
Whereas the triumphant resistance of the island in
the first instance appeared to have provided the
ultimate proof of the island’s invincibility as well as
its indispensability, rapid changes in the broader
international scene before long altered the parame-
ters of Malta’s usefulness to the security of others.
The onset of the new, this time global, east-west
contest, coupled with Britain’s decline as a great
power and world empire, necessitated a revision of
Malta’s security function, if not needs. 
At first, there seemed to be no question of a
change of function. Even after the decision to grant
Indian independence in 1947 and the handing over
of responsibility for Greece and Turkey to the United
States in the same year, Britain for another decade
at least remained determined to maintain control over
its possessions in the Mediterranean. And although
Britain’s security objectives were to an increasing
extent subsumed into the security objectives of the
western alliance, there were no concrete signs before
1956 that Britain had any intention of relinquishing
Malta. Indeed, during the Suez War, in which Malta
resumed its traditional role of forward base for the
British operation, the British Government was seri-
ously entertaining a Maltese plan for full integration
with Britain. The plan collapsed largely because
Harold Macmillan’s Government immediately after
Suez embarked on large scale cuts in overseas
defence, signalling Britain’s acceptance of its reduced
international status and consequently a declining
interest in maintaining its costly overseas security
infrastructure.
By this time, the Maltese were well accustomed
to articulating their country’s strategic function in
terms of economic value. To be sure, as has been
already outlined, they had been regarding it as such
for centuries, given the centrality of foreign defence
spending to their livelihood. The difference now was
that the central role of the imperial power’s defence
spending in the economy could no longer be taken
for granted. This was not only because British
defence spending was set to decline. It was also and
chiefly because the Maltese after the war looked
forward to a more equitable relationship with the
British, in which the latter would contribute respon-
sibly to the construction of a new diversified
economy that would cease to depend too much on the
whims of a sector that in its turn depended upon
fluctuations in international relations, upon which
the Maltese could exert no control. The Maltese
argument, fortified by recollections of the ordeal
suffered during the war in the service of Britain and
its allies, focused on the long record of service to
the security of the British empire, and hence on the
responsibility of the latter to improve the people’s
living standards. It stressed the point that, having
given more than its fair share in the war to liberate
Europe, Malta deserved to be included in the plan for
the reconstruction of Europe. As early as 1949 the
first Maltese Labour Government insisted with
Britain that since Malta was not a sovereign state and
therefore did not qualify for American Marshall Aid,
Britain should allocate to Malta a proportion of its
own share. In the first official Maltese document
placing a cash value on the island’s strategic prop-
erties, an ultimatum was handed to the British
Government to the effect that if Britain was unwilling
to pass on to Malta its due allocation, Malta would
offer itself as a military and naval base to the United
States for an adequate price.1
Britain’s rejection of the Maltese demand brought
Dom Mintoff, the original instigator of the ulti-
matum, to the leadership of the Maltese Labour Party.
Mintoff, who was to dominate the Maltese political
scene for many years hence, made the realisation of
the financial value of Malta’s strategic properties the
pivot of his relations with Britain and the western
powers until he got his way, much later, in the 1970s.
In the course of his endeavours, and after several
frustrations, he sought to capitalise on the negative
strategic value of Malta, dropping hints that if Britain
and the west no longer appreciated the value of the
island, their adversaries might. These adversaries
might be either the Soviets (remotely) or radical Arab
states (approximately) (see Howard Wriggins, 1975).
Non alignment and neutrality, with a strong emphasis
on the Mediterranean vocation of foreign policy,
ultimately emerged as the synthesis, shunning both
alignment with west or east, and identification with
either north or south.
While haggling over economic matters became the
hallmark of Anglo-Maltese relations for more than a
generation, the island’s security continued to be a
matter of slight relevance to the Maltese, underlined
by the understanding that Britain would defend Malta
anyway because it was in the former’s interest to do
so. The aftermath of the ‘Marshall Aid’ crisis of 1949
was five years of unstable and ineffective coalition
or minority government presided over by the (con-
servative) Nationalist Party. Little was achieved in
the way of economic restructuring, whereas the future
of British defence spending levels was ever more
dubious. When Mintoff’s Labour Party returned to
power in 1955 his recipe for economic rescue was
integration with Britain, which if accepted entailed
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an assumption of responsibility by the latter for
Malta’s economic restructuring. Anthony Eden’s
Conservative Government welcomed the proposal for
imperialist reasons. But when British imperialism
was shattered soon after in the Suez War, the British
lost interest and gave plenty of signs that their chief
concern was to disengage from their responsibilities.
Joined by the Nationalist Opposition, Mintoff shifted
his demand to independence and resigned in 1958. 
During the next four years, in which Malta
reverted to direct colonial rule while the British
accepted the principle of independence, the debate
centred on the form that independence would assume.
Once parliamentary government was restored,
returning the Nationalist Party to power, in 1962, the
chief disagreement in the negotiations for indepen-
dence was the future of security relations between
Britain and Malta. The ensuing Treaty of Mutual
Defence and Assistance gave Britain the right to
retain a garrison and base in Malta for ten years for
the purpose of mutual defence, while committing
Britain to awarding modest loans and grants
(Keesing’s, 1964: 20108). The package was accepted
by George Borg Olivier’s Nationalist Government
and rejected by Mintoff, who denounced it as a sham
independence in which the British abdicated all
responsibility for Malta’s future while retaining the
only feature that ever interested them for a bargain
price. 
The defence agreement accompanying indepen-
dence in 1964 meant that even after independence
Malta still did not need to be concerned about its
external security. The internal political disagreement
rested on two points, namely, the level of financial
aid and the degree of power that Britain retained by
virtue of its continued military presence. The per-
sisting decline in British defence spending and the
uphill struggle to find money to build the country’s
infrastructure continued to be the basis of political
debate where Anglo-Maltese relations were con-
cerned. Otherwise, Malta’s foreign policy firmly
embedded it in the western hemisphere as a matter
of course and NATO even moved its Mediterranean
Command headquarters there. NATO however turned
down requests by Malta to become a member, or even
an observer.2
By and large, Maltese leaders of differing polit-
ical persuasions were dissatisfied throughout the
1960s by Britain and the west’s hesitation to commit
significant funds for the economic development of
Malta, persisting in the belief that the island deserved
more in return for its habitual loyalty to the west and
its contribution to western defence. The western
alliance, which since its inception regarded the
Mediterranean as Europe’s southern flank, was using
the island pretty much in the same way as earlier
imperial powers had done, paying for such use more
indirectly than directly, that is to say, by the multi-
plier effect that their defence spending had on the
economy. Incidentally, the arrangements with the
British and the presence of NATO personnel and
facilities presumed that Malta was guaranteed against
any foreign aggression. 
The energetic thrust of Dom Mintoff’s foreign
policy upon the return of the Labour Party to power
in 1971 underlined further the supposition that Malta
gave much more to the security of Britain and the
west than it received. The tone of his foreign policy
almost suggested that Malta’s dependence on western
defence was at best irrelevant, at worst detrimental
to its own security. The rationale that came to be
increasingly articulated was that Malta had nothing
to fear from the adversaries of the west, whether
these were the distant Soviets in the east, or the
neighbouring Arabs in the south. Libya, for example,
where Gaddafi had only recently come to power and
closed down the American base not only was not
considered a threat, but regarded the presence of a
British base and of NATO in Malta as a threat to
itself. In other words, rather than feeling secure on
account the presence of western military forces on
the island, Malta was being impeded from pursuing
amicable relations with its Mediterranean neighbours.
On its own, Malta had neither the potential nor the
need to be aggressive. Conversely, though it did not
necessarily always follow, no one had an interest to
threaten the security of Malta if the island did not
represent the interest of a bigger power. It was the
presence of foreign forces that rendered Malta threat-
ening to its neighbours, just as it was the role of
frontier outpost for the west that might give any
relevance to Malta in the eyes of the east. There
was sufficient historical precedent to support the
argument that imperial possession or bloc alignment
might constitute an inherent threat to Malta’s
security. 
The negotiations with Britain to revise the 1964
Treaty of Mutual Defence and Assistance dragged on
for many months between the summer of 1971 and
March 1972, along the way emitting clear signals that
the west had no reason to take Malta’s loyalty for
granted. During the negotiations Mintoff’s hand was
strengthened considerably by Colonel Gaddafi’s
known readiness to replace the income lost by Malta
should disagreement lead to a British decision to
close down the base (Brown, 1971). The revised
agreement restricted the rights and parameters of
Britain’s use of the Maltese base and more than
tripled the rent for its use. To raise the additional
money, since Britain was not prepared to do so alone,
other NATO members, particularly Italy, agreed to
make a contribution, even though NATO henceforth
was not allowed to have anything to do with the base.
Indeed, NATO had to close down its Mediterranean
headquarters in Malta and moved it to Naples.
NATO’s and in particular Italy’s concern that the
negotiations with Britain must not break down was
driven by the fear that a government in dire need of
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financial resources might be pushed to strike a
security deal with Libya. The new Defence
Agreement was valid for seven years and was not
renewable. In 1979 the British base closed down
peacefully and all occupied lands were returned to
the Maltese Government (Micallef, 1979).
Believing that Malta had nothing to fear from the
adversaries of the west was only one step from
believing that it had something to fear from the west
itself. And in due course fear of the west did become
a matter of some concern to Mintoff’s government.
Mintoff’s new foreign policy, beginning with the
tough negotiations to revise the agreement with
Britain, and proceeding with the policy of estab-
lishing close relations with any country prepared to
support Malta’s economic development, made him
increasingly unpopular in western eyes. Malta’s non
alignment, with a backdrop of friendly relations with
countries such as Libya, China and North Korea, was
interpreted as unfriendly and created the spectre of
a western intervention to bring Malta back into the
western hemisphere. Nevertheless, however seriously
or otherwise this risk was regarded, little could be
done to prepare against the eventuality of such an
intervention. Malta’s own armed forces were neces-
sarily useless, not even to hold out briefly until
foreign assistance could be procured. For no state,
however friendly, could be conceivably relied upon
to confront western power because of Malta. Besides,
western, which is to say American, intervention
might take the form of intervention to restore order
after internal turmoil. During the second half of the
1970s, Mintoff’s socialist policies were met with stiff
organised internal opposition and produced an
equally stiff reaction, altogether creating a highly
tense internal situation. The situation was exacer-
bated after the 1981 elections when Labour returned
to government with more seats but fewer votes than
the Nationalist Opposition. Whatever the scenario,
the bottom line was that Malta was geopolitically
within the western hemisphere and its external
security ultimately relied on the good will of the
west, irrespective of which foreign policy Malta
opted for.
Even before the closure of the British base in 1979
therefore Mintoff headed for the security option
sometimes preferred by countries lying in the midst
of antagonistic neighbours, namely the adoption of
neutrality. Neutrality was not new to Maltese history.
In more brutal times, the multinational Order of St.
John had adopted a policy of neutrality to steer clear
of involvement in intra-European warfare and thus to
safeguard its sovereignty as an Order. Neutrality was
not merely a logical sequel to non-alignment. It
aimed once again to realise the negative strategic
value of Malta, this time by persuading competing
sides that neutrality was preferable to alignment with
the opposite side. Once again, neutrality combined
the objectives of security and financial assistance.
Originally, the Maltese Government hoped to have
four security guarantors, two from either flank of the
Mediterranean. These would be Italy, France, Libya
and Algeria. Ultimately, however, only one country,
Italy, agreed to guarantee Malta’s neutral status and
signed a protocol for financial, economic and tech-
nical assistance in 1980, one year after the closure of
the British base (Bin, 1995). While Malta’s neutral
status has been recognised by a number of countries
since, the treaty with Italy remains to date the only
concrete agreement which provides for support in the
event of an external threat to Malta’s security.
Although a far cry from the multilateral international
guarantee originally hoped for, it did render Malta
to a large extent safe from foreign intervention.
Whatever other directions Malta’s foreign policy
might be heading in, it was at least implicitly roped
back into the western hemisphere by dint of Italy’s
place in the western alliance, thus also damping
speculation about the possibility of a forceful or
subversive recovery of Malta by the west. Inasmuch
as a country that was also a member of the biggest
armed alliance in the world agreed to underwrite
Malta’s security in return for neutrality, and not for
the award of military facilities, the treaty with Italy
constituted a breakthrough in Malta’s history as a
strategic island.
In fact, although it was not the immediate reason
for the signing of the Italo-Maltese agreement, a real
threat had just appeared for the first time to Malta’s
security, literally weeks before the agreement was
signed. The threat however was not from the west,
but from Libya. Following years of discussion over
the respective rights of Malta and Libya to prospect
for offshore oil on the sea bed between the two
countries, and an unratified agreement to resolve the
issue amicably at the International Court of Justice,
the Maltese Government refused to wait any longer
for Libya’s ratification and in 1980 contracted an
Italian firm to begin drilling in the zone claimed by
Malta. No sooner had the Italian rig started drilling
than a Libyan warship ordered it away. The Maltese
Government had to back down and instructed the
operation to stop. Briefly, Malta woke up to the
reality of its helplessness and was relieved soon after
that the agreement with Italy was concluded. The
treaty with Italy which followed soon after did not
extend to the eventuality of a conflict caused by an
action unilaterally decided by Malta, but at least it
shielded the island from a gratuitous act of aggres-
sion from a volatile friendly nation turned hostile.3
The Malta-Libya crisis in fact acted as a catalyst,
on one hand raising Maltese consciousness that
national security called for concrete measures, on the
other enabling Malta’s interlocutors to evaluate the
real locus of Malta’s foreign policy. Not only did it
drive home the point that Malta’s security could be
threatened. It also highlighted the reality that only a
country which had a national interest in defending
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Malta might be willing to do so. And while it might
do so anyway with or without treaty provisions, a
treaty was preferable. To the west, Mintoff’s angry
reaction to Gaddafi’s aggression was a signal that
Malta’s association with Libya placed no limits on
the former’s sovereignty, thereby easing speculation
that Malta was intrinsically loyal to a country that
was regarded with suspicion in the west. Indeed,
Mintoff publicly warned Gaddafi that Libya’s action
was far more damaging to Libya than to Malta, con-
sidering Libya’s image abroad. Strongly implying
that an American offer had been made, he added that
Gaddafi should consider himself lucky that Mintoff
resisted the obvious option of inviting the Americans
to protect Malta, typically explaining that he did not
do so because the last time the Maltese asked for
foreign protection (of the British against the French
in 1800), the protection became a virtual occupation
lasting almost two centuries (l-Orizzont, 6 Sep.
1980). The signing of the protocol with Italy shortly
after was both a signal to Libya that Malta was not
isolated – without however constituting a threat to
it, since it did not entail realignment with the western
alliance – and a mitigation of Mintoff’s latent suspi-
cion of American intentions. In due course normality
returned to Maltese-Libyan relations also and Libya
did ratify the agreement to take the offshore
prospecting question to the International Court,
which gave its ruling in 1985. In 1984, Malta even
signed a Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation with
Libya, which included a Protocol on Co-operation
in Security, in which the two countries among other
things pledged to share security information in their
mutual interest.4 The agreement may have saved
Gaddafi’s life in 1986, when Malta’s radar picked out
the American bombers heading for Tripoli and alerted
the Libyan leader.
Other than that, it was through the nature of its
foreign policy that Malta aimed to enhance its long
term security once it shed its matter-of-course adher-
ence to the west in the early 1970s. This it did by
projecting itself as a factor for peace and stability in
the Mediterranean region, taking every opportunity
available to champion the notion that Mediterranean
and European security were indivisible and that the
Mediterranean region should not be the contesting
ground of adversary powers pursuing their national
and global interests at the expense of peace in the
region. Apart from establishing and extending
Malta’s relations with the Arab world, so that these
became as important as those with European coun-
tries, the chief initiatives of what may be termed
Malta’s Mediterranean policy consisted in efforts to
persuade Europe and the superpowers to include the
Mediterranean in the Conference for Security and
Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) process and in
criticism of superpower military presence and com-
petition in the Mediterranean. The gist of the
rationale behind this approach was that the whole
Mediterranean should be a beneficiary of the process
that aimed to achieve security through co-operation
and that east-west détente in Europe must not be
pursued at the expense of its immediate
Mediterranean neighbourhood, where superpower
competition continued to be rampant.
Inasmuch as no real security threat materialised,
with the exception of the oil prospecting incident
with Libya which to some extent was precipitated
by Maltese brinkmanship, one can say that this phase
of Malta’s security policy was successful, although
of course the non-materialisation of a threat is not
necessarily proof that security was adequately
provided for. However, such a security policy was
based on a number of considered calculations. The
first was that no country or group of countries had
an interest in violating Malta’s sovereignty so long
as Malta fostered good relations with its neighbours
and did not actively threaten anyone’s national
interest. It also rested on the historically-supported
premise that in an international condition of latent
confrontation between armed blocs and their clients,
non alignment and neutrality threatened neither side,
whereas alignment would have made Malta a target
of the opposite side. The policy also carried the
advantage that Malta, despite its small size, could
formulate its foreign policy and conduct its foreign
relations without restrictions on its sovereignty.
Finally and perhaps most importantly, in a region
where most countries have had to sustain the burden
of large defence budgets at the expense of pressing
social and economic needs, Malta was able to direct
its scarce resources to its development needs and,
indeed, to receive a degree of financial assistance in
return for its choice of security policy. 
In retrospect, the policies pursued between 1971
and 1987 constituted a radical recasting of the
security cum economic arrangements that had been
moulded in Malta’s colonial history. Under certain
aspects, they were born out of necessity, for despite
the heavy ideological undertones that such policies
acquired, they were largely formulated only as an
alternative to the west’s original refusal to make
Malta an integral part of it in economic as well as
security terms. Once adopted, however, such policies
acquired a life and meaning of their own. Their cul-
mination was reached in January 1987, a few months
before the general elections that resulted in the return
of the Nationalist Party to power. A two-thirds
parliamentary majority being required, both sides of
the House of Representatives agreed to entrench
neutrality in the Maltese constitution. Malta was
mow defined as ‘a neutral state actively pursuing
peace, security and social progress among all nations
by adhering to a policy of non-alignment and refusing
to participate in any military alliance’ (Malta
Constitution, 1992). The new Nationalist Govern-
ment thus returned to power in 1987 legally com-
mitted to the principle of neutrality, whereas the chief
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thrust of its foreign policy programme was a realign-
ment with Europe and the west, at least in broad
political terms. 
The circumstances under which the formal
adoption of Malta’s neutrality took place suggest
strongly that the then Nationalist Opposition party
agreed to support the constitutional amendment less
out of conviction than out of expedience. The chief
interest of the Nationalist Opposition where the
constitution was concerned, was to bring about an
amendment that would obviate a repetition of the
1981 electoral result, where it obtained a majority
of votes but a minority of parliamentary seats.
Agreement on neutrality was effectively Labour’s
quid pro quo for the agreement on the electoral
changes, and both amendments were promulgated in
January 1987. While it is certainly correct to say that
the Nationalist Party harboured no wish to put the
clock back and jettison all features of foreign policy
adopted during sixteen years of Labour Government,
the neutrality clause did represent a concrete restric-
tion on future foreign policy options. Inasmuch as the
new Nationalist Government made full membership
of the then European Community its primary foreign
policy goal, the neutrality clause promised to raise
difficulties in the light of the Community’s objec-
tive of fuller integration even on a political level, just
recently signalled by the Single European Act. The
Nationalist Government of Eddie Fenech Adami took
the attitude that neutrality was not an impediment to
EC membership and in 1990 lodged a formal appli-
cation for membership. The Opposition Labour Party,
however, which was against full membership, argued
that it was. With the signing of the Maastrict Treaty
on European Union in 1992 aiming to consolidate the
progress towards political integration and to formu-
late a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)
the question of whether Malta’s neutrality would
constitute an impediment to membership came more
to the fore. To Labour’s claims that membership of
the EU went against the provisions regarding the
country’s neutrality, the Nationalist Government
consistently replied with two main arguments. The
first was that the EU itself does not regard Malta’s
neutrality as a legal impediment. The second
argument was that the constitutional provision bases
neutrality on non-alignment, a concept that has lost
relevance with the termination of the cold war. It
argued that the context within which Malta’s neu-
trality was defined was one of competing armed
alliances and did not contemplate non-alignment in
any other context, such as adherence to a European
Common Foreign and Security Policy (Bin, 1995).5
Nevertheless, when the Commission of the
European Union issued its Opinion, or avis, on
Malta’s application in 1993, it did suggest that a
constitutional amendment might be necessary to clear
the legal difficulties that neutrality might constitute
if Malta were to be admitted (European Commission,
1993). The EU indeed could have no interest to get
entangled in a legal quagmire and the message was
quite clear: it was the responsibility of the Maltese
people to sort out this issue in a way that adapted
the country’s constitution to the EU’s structures and
objectives. This approach delivered a formidable
weapon in the hands of the Labour Opposition, which
represented almost half the electorate and was not
inclined to make life for the Government easier,
especially on this issue. In the end, the Government
may have had no option but to seek to resolve the
issue in the Maltese law courts. An attempt to test
both the resolve of the Labour Party and the inter-
pretation of the judiciary appears to have been made
in 1995, when the Prime Minister, his Government
having just signed the Partnership for Peace pro-
gramme with NATO (see below), challenged an
indignant Leader of the Opposition to take him to the
Constitutional Court. The latter did not rise to the
bait, and pledged instead to pull Malta out of the
programme within a week of Labour’s return to
power (Kulhadd, 2 Apr. 1995).
All in all, the Nationalist Government’s hand was
weakened by the lack of enthusiasm or hurry shown
by the EU to admit Malta as a member, necessitating
the Government to show more eagerness to join than
was prudent for a party that had yet to reach the
negotiation stage of accession. While it is reasonable
to believe that the EU had no objection in principle
to Malta’s joining, the country’s size rendered it
largely irrelevant to the EU’s prosperity. On the other
hand, it smallness could constitute institutional
problems, which is also why Malta was told to wait
until after the end of the Inter-Governmental
Conference, which began in 1996, before accession
negotiations could start. In short, the Nationalist
Government’s tenacious quest to join and its apparent
readiness to accept all the implications of member-
ship unconditionally made Malta a model applicant
from the EU point of view, but not when within
Malta itself there was no consensus. 
The Government of Fenech Adami handled a
potential stalemate tenaciously and resourcefully.
Faced with a European Union that could be better
described as not against Maltese membership than
in favour of it, and with an Opposition that knew too
well the political leverage that neutrality gave it,
Fenech Adami’s Government endeavoured to
produce a positive out of two negatives, precisely
by reviving the issue of security. 
From the start, the Government aimed to attract
Europe’s concern by repeatedly asserting that Malta
wanted to join the EC not only for economic but also
and especially for political reasons. Although such
‘political reasons’ were not quite clearly defined at
first, the implication was that it was in the EC’s
interest to recover Malta back into the western
hemisphere while the Labour Party was out of power.
However, in terms of its chances of accession,
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Malta’s efforts to attract the attention and interest of
the EC began at an inopportune time. The interna-
tional situation that emerged shortly after the change
of government in 1987 had created more disadvan-
tages than advantages for the new government’s bid
for European membership. There was the advantage
that it could underplay the obligation towards neu-
trality and non alignment since there was progres-
sively less to be neutral and non-aligned about. But
this was more than offset by the fact that with the
end of the cold war, there was less cause for concern
that Malta’s weaning from the west implied an
opening to the east, even if the new Government had
not been so unequivocally pro-west anyway. Another
disadvantage was that a whole new sphere of interest
opened up in central and eastern Europe, diverting
the EC’s attention away from the Mediterranean. The
great watershed in international relations occurring
in 1989 meanwhile found the European Community
independently embarking on a process of consolida-
tion and deepening. All told, the EC now had less
motivation to be concerned with the political advan-
tages of admitting economically less developed
Mediterranean states, or other states for that matter,
as had been the case with Greece and, more recently,
Spain and Portugal. From now on, new members had
to have reached levels of economic development and
structuring equivalent to those of existing members
before joining, not after. Witness the speed with
which the EFTA countries’ application for member-
ship was processed and accepted.
Whereas the Maltese Government lost no time
tackling the restructuring of the economy, so that in
many respects Malta came to pursue economic
policies as though it were already a member, the
political hurdles did not go away. However, devel-
opments on the international scene, which had shifted
the parameters within which the Government was
trying to operate soon after 1987, eventually pre-
sented a new opening. After the original euphoria
following the fall of the Berlin Wall and the under-
stood implication that the great threat to Europe’s
security was gone, western Europeans began waking
up to security concerns that had existed for a long
time but with which they had dealt only half-heart-
edly. Though not always connected, the end of the
cold war was followed by rising concern about
dangers to Europe emanating from the south. South-
north migration, the spread of militant Islamic fun-
damentalism, the dangers of chemical and nuclear
weapons proliferation, traffic in illegal substances,
terrorism, and a morass of other dangers shook
Europeans awake to the reality that if an iron curtain
had fallen in Europe, a chasm was deepening
between them and their immediate neighbours across
the Mediterranean. Decades of initiatives to promote
Euro-Arab dialogue and to pursue Community
‘Mediterranean policies’ had not brought the two
sides of the Mediterranean any nearer in either
political or economic developmental terms. The
resulting security threat, perceived by the haves from
the have-nots, was under certain aspects more dan-
gerous than the one which had just disappeared, if
only because it took many different forms and was
less easy to pin point. Europe’s awakening to the
urgency of fostering its own security by building
bridges of co-operation with the non-European
Mediterranean states, which found concrete expres-
sion in the 1995 Barcelona Euro-Mediterranean
Partnership Conference, was the cue for the Maltese
Government to put it to the EU that Malta did, after
all, have something concrete to offer to it (Fenech
Adami, 1995).6
The new Mediterranean focus of the European
Union was as opportune for the Nationalist
Government’s case for membership as the end of the
cold war had been inopportune. For it seemed to
restore to Malta the security value that had histori-
cally been its only claim to fame and importance.
With Libya under UN sanctions and still regarded in
the west as a sponsor of terrorism, and the Algerian
regime precariously holding its own against the
biggest known Islamic fundamentalist popular
movement in the Arab world, Malta seemed to
recover its strategic importance in both a negative
and a positive sense. Insofar as Europe may perceive
a threat from which it wants to defend itself, it might
have an interest in taking Malta within its frontiers.
Insofar as Europe seriously wants to build confidence
through co-operation with its southern neighbours,
Malta’s established tradition of casting itself as a
natural bridge between Europe and north Africa
renders it a useful asset. The Maltese Nationalist
Government hence mounted a campaign to demon-
strate that Malta was both necessary and useful to the
EU: necessary as a frontier post if it should come to
pass that Europe finds itself in confrontation with the
Arab world, useful as a bridge to support Europe’s
endeavours to prevent such a confrontation. On the
first aspect, bypassing altogether the potential
limitations entailed by the country’s neutrality, the
Government began giving clear signs that it sup-
ported all the security initiatives and objectives of
western Europe, and moreover wanted to be part of
them. Thus, in 1994 it declared that Malta was
prepared to contribute to UN peace-keeping missions,
supported warmly Baladour’s initiative for a Pact of
Stability in Europe, and addressed for the first time
a meeting of the Western European Union, while
berating the Non-Aligned Movement, of which Malta
is a member, for failing to find a new post-cold war
identity (Fenech 2, 1995). In April 1995, then, the
Government took the even more audacious step of
signing for the Partnership for Peace programme, the
first outside central and eastern Europe, bringing
Malta closer to an association with NATO than it had
ever been. In May 1996, Malta’s Foreign Minister
told a press conference in Brussels that ‘Malta hopes
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to take part in [the EU’s] common foreign and
security policy . . . [and] had, in more than thirty
cases, come into line with the political track adopted
by the Union’, a position statement received with
uncharacteristic enthusiasm by Brussels (Europe, 15
May 1996). In the meantime, Malta was once again
becoming a regular host to NATO warships, restoring
to the Grand Harbour the once familiar physiognomy
of a naval port.
On the second aspect, the Government placed
increasing stress in its statements on the tradition and
experience of Malta in brokering good relations
between Arabs and Europeans. Though this tradition
was chiefly a legacy of the preceding Labour
Governments, it was upheld by the Nationalist Party
once in power, also because the EC approved of it.
Thus in the first contact with Brussels following the
election of 1987, the Minister for Foreign Affairs had
been told by Claude Cheysson, Commissioner in
charge of Community relations with Mediterranean
Countries, that Malta should consolidate further its
relations with the Arab Maghreb, in the context of
the EC’s western Mediterranean members’ initiatives
in that direction (Malta Review, 17 June 1987). Malta
has participated in the various Euro-Mediterranean
initiatives undertaken since, including the ‘Five plus
Five’ forum, the Conference for Security and Co-
operation in the Mediterranean (CSCM), and the
Western Mediterranean Forum, admittedly unspec-
tacular initiatives which nevertheless signalled
Europe’s at first slow recognition of the need to foster
relations with the non-European Mediterranean
(Pace, 12–13). In its turn, Malta has come up with
its own proposals, namely the setting up of a Council
for the Mediterranean (The Times, 10 April 1993) and
a Pact for Stability in the Mediterranean (The Times,
23 Sep. 1995). Underlying both the Community and
the Maltese initiatives, was the tendency to replicate
European institutions in the Mediterranean. With the
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Conference due in
November 1995, the Government repeatedly spoke
of the need to strengthen the ‘Mediterranean dimen-
sion’ of the EU and of Malta’s potential to be a
bridgehead of Euro-Mediterranean security (The
Times, 25 November 1995). Meanwhile, having been
told that accession negotiations would begin six
months after the termination of the 1996 EU Inter-
Governmental Conference, the Government’s state-
ments were also motivated by its apprehension that
the Central and Eastern European countries might
jump the Mediterranean applicants in the queue for
accession.
The reverse side of the Nationalist Government’s
unqualified loyalty to Europe’s security interests
remained the question of whether Malta’s usefulness
could be realised in view of its neutral status. The
Opposition Labour Party’s disagreement over EU
membership and its adamant resistance to any
attempts to tamper with the country’s neutrality
remained a reality the EU could not ignore and
accordingly expected the Maltese people themselves
to sort out. Hence, the almost gratuitous promoting
of the issue of national security to the top tier of
the country’s list of priorities represented the
Government’s strategy of creating a national con-
sciousness about an issue that public opinion had
hitherto tended to regard passively. The corollary of
upgrading the importance of the security issue was
that something had to be done about it. The implied
message to the nation was that not only was neu-
trality not enough to guarantee national security, but
that it could not be allowed to impede concrete
measures to safeguard it. In a nutshell, the EU’s
projected Common Foreign and Security Policy made
membership more, not less, suitable for Malta. The
Government thus aimed to extricate itself from the
potential checkmate posed by neutrality by shifting
the burden of justification onto the Labour
Opposition.7 Although this still did not dispose of the
legal problem, it might have been useful in the event
of a referendum having to be called.
While still in opposition, the Labour Party, which
regarded Europe’s belated acceptance of the insepa-
rability of Mediterranean from European security as
a vindication of past Labour Government exhorta-
tions, of course had no quarrel with the idea of active
participation in Euro-Mediterranean dialogues. It did
however perceive that the Nationalist Government
was seeking every possible way to circumvent neu-
trality and align Malta with western security struc-
tures, where the hegemony of NATO was clearly
emerging. It considered that the Nationalist
Government, which in the past had been prepared to
align Malta with NATO in an east-west context, was
now heading for alignment with it in a north-south
context. The Labour Party therefore responded by
formulating its own security blueprint. Holding fast
to the principle that Malta’s neutrality was not nego-
tiable, it claimed that the Government was not really
worried by any threat to national security, which the
latter failed to identify, but was only pandering to the
EU in order to improve the chances of Malta’s acces-
sion, as such serving the security of the EU, not of
Malta. On the contrary, Malta’s security was best
served by its continued adherence to neutrality, in
fact as in spirit, the more so if a north-south con-
frontation across the Mediterranean was being
contemplated. Was not the island’s frontier location
the essential reason justifying non alignment and
neutrality? Alignment with the northern bloc, in a
scenario of such a confrontation, would return Malta
to its subservient role of a frontier post in someone
else’s interest, and therefore a vulnerable target. So
long as Malta maintained amicable relations with
both its European and its Arab neighbours, there
existed in fact no threat from either side. Besides,
security concerns in the contemporary Mediterranean
had more to do with international lawlessness and
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organised crime than with the potential of a large
scale confrontation, and Malta did not need to align
itself with any political-military bloc to give its con-
tribution in that field and co-ordinate its efforts with
others’, in its own as well as its neighbours’ interest.
Other than that, the treaty with Italy guaranteeing
Malta’s neutrality should continue to be the founda-
tion of Malta’s security policy. In the same spirit of
that treaty then, Malta should seek a bilateral treaty
with the European Union as a whole, which would
be in line with Labour’s position of wanting close
relations with the EU short of full membership. Such
a course should neutralise Malta’s negative strategic
value to Europe without implying a threat to Malta’s
southern neighbours. Malta would meanwhile remain
prepared to sign non-aggression agreements with any
Mediterranean country wishing to do so (Malta
Labour Party, 1994).
On October 26, 1996, anticipated general elections
were held in Malta, this time returning to office the
Labour Party. Security was not high among the
priorities of either political party during the electoral
campaign. Nor was EU membership – not surpris-
ingly given both the lukewarm response received
from Brussels so far, and the unpopularity of the
recently introduced Value Added Tax, believed by
many to have been introduced to comply with EU
expectations, and which Labour pledged to remove
once in office. The first measure taken by the new
Labour Government, only two days after assuming
office, was to withdraw from NATO’s Partnership for
Peace. Significantly, the Government was careful to
explain to NATO that the reason for withdrawing was
that it considered PfP membership to be incompat-
ible with the country’s constitutional neutrality. The
Government indeed hastened to add that this was ‘not
a political measure to signify the distancing of Malta
away from Europe’, that diplomatic relations with
NATO would be maintained, and that Malta was
eager to continue co-operating in the field of security
on a bilateral or multilateral level, as well as to take
an active part in promoting co-operation and stability
in the Mediterranean (The Times, 1 Nov. 1996). 
In conclusion, it would appear that beneath the
rhetoric promoting broader competing political
agendas, there exists in Malta much more consensus
on the question of security than might appear on the
surface, or than there has been during the past
decades. What has essentially changed with the gov-
ernment is, first, that neutrality is again regarded as
an instrument, rather than a hindrance, of Malta’s
own security as well as that of its neighbourhood;
and second, that Malta’s security policy need not be
subjected to the question of EU membership, whether
the Labour Government decides to formally withdraw
the membership application or to leave its options
open. Other than that, there is consensus that Malta
lies within the European sphere and that it is with
Europe, from where of course no threat is contem-
plated, that the basis of the island’s security must be
worked out in the first place, without prejudice to
Malta’s relations with its southern neighbours.
Finally, where once there had been a marked diver-
gence between one party’s ‘Mediterranean’ and the
other’s ‘European’ orientation, consensus has been
reached also on the intrinsic value, in the national
interest, of maximising Malta’s participation in and
contribution to Euro-Mediterranean security through
dialogue and co-operation. 
Notes
1. For a detailed account of Malta’s political history from the
end of the war to independence, see Pirotta, 1987; 1991.
2. See reports in the Times of Malta, 5 Nov. 1962; 17 Feb. 1968;
26 June 1968; 18 June 1971. 
3. For a review of Italo-Maltese relations in the years preceding
and following the treaty, see Fiammetta Atzei 1985.
4. For the text of the treaty see Rivista di Studi Politici
Internazionali, April–June 1985, 301–303.
5. For the respective legal arguments in favour and against see
in particular Tonio Borg, ‘Malta’s Neutrality and EU
Membership’, The [Malta] Sunday Times, 27 Feb. 1994 and
Alex Sceberras Trigona, ‘The Politics of Neutrality, 1, 2, and
3’, The [Malta] Sunday Times, 12, 19 and 26 June 1994.
6. See also for example report of the Prime Minister’s speech to
the Paris Istitut Francais des Relations Internationales, on 11
Mar 1996, in In-Nazzjon, 12 Mar. 1996.
7. See Prime Minister’s speech commemorating ‘Freedom Day’,
reported in The Times, 1 Apr. 1996. There is an element of
irony in the choice of this particular occasion to expound on
the Government’s security policy, since Freedom Day, on 31
March, denotes the closure of the British base, which is much
closer to the heart of the Labour Party than the Nationalist
Party.
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